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The objective of this study is to test the dynamic relationships among variables including farm 
real estate values, farm returns, farm program payments, and real interest rates in an income 
capitalization model.  Our analysis is unique in multiple ways: (1) it covers the period beginning 
with the introduction of the first farm bill in 1933 through 2006; (2) assumes endogeneity of the 
variables, and (3) develops a dynamic modeling framework.  Endogeneity is assumed among 
farm real estate values, farm program payments, and farm receipts since the direction of causality 
is unclear from a theoretical standpoint.  Results indicate that policy makers are reactive rather 
than pro-active in making transfers to farmers.  Once farm program payments are implemented, 
payments have positive impacts only in the short run on the value of farm real estate.  However, 
considering endogeneity, the model suggests that it is possible that farm program payments have 
a lasting positive indirect impact (via farm returns) on the value of farm real estate. 
 
JEL classification: Q18, H50; C32 
Keywords: Dynamics; Farm programs payments; Farm real estate values; Vector error 
correction model; U.S. data, 1933-2006. 
  
 
Nature of Dynamic Relationships between Farm Real Estate Values 
and Federal Farm Program Payments 
 




Policy may be viewed as a guiding principle leading to a course of action pursued by the 
government.  Specifically, agricultural policies have traditionally been driven by the instability 
of farm production, commodity prices and income.  Due to these agricultural policies the U.S. 
government transfers large sums of money to the agricultural sector, relative to its importance as 
an industry in the general economy.
1  The most visible of those transfers are producer and 
landowner subsidies.  Other public transfers include investments in research and development, 
and extension.  In addition, investments in public infrastructure are presumed to increase the 
efficiency of agricultural production.  Finally, individuals who receive income from agriculture 
benefit from a variety of tax features that result in a smaller personal tax burden than they would 
otherwise incur.  While agricultural policies may be driven by the desire to stabilize farm 
production, prices, and income, the consequences of farm program payments on the structure of 
U.S. agriculture has often been a concern to economists (e.g., Gardner, 1987, 1990, 1992; 
Hennessy, 1998; Sumner, 2003; Miljkovic, 2004; Miljkovic, Jin, and Paul, 2008).  These 
agriculture policies stabilize farm income when the producer is faced with a shortfall in 
production by providing payments under commodity programs and other farm programs, disaster 
payments, and crop insurance
2. 
 
Earlier studies (see the next section) have examined the effect of these farm program 
payments on farm real estate values.  To summarize, these studies have analyzed farm real estate 
values to identify the principal factors explaining agricultural land values using cross-sectional or 
time-series data at the farm level or aggregate state or national level and concluded farm program 
payments are capitalized into the value of farm land.  However, previous research examining the 
importance and effect of farm program payments on farm real estate values has two caveat.  
First, the extension of the model to include farm program payment faces identification issues 
introduced by the counter-cyclical or inverse relationship between farm receipts and farm 
program payments as indicated by Shaik, Atwood, and Helmers (2005) and Goodwin et al. 
(2003).  Second, studies examining the importance of farm program payments in a static 
framework fail to address the short-run and long-run dynamics of farm program payments and 
other variables on farm real estate values. 
 
Ideally, including additional variables is possible, and even desirable, when dealing with 
farm rather than national models.  For instance, the impact of urban development on rural-urban 
fringes may be relevant for 3-4 percent of the total of agricultural land; similarly, alternative 
farm land uses (for recreation or hunting, for instance) is applicable to farms in certain regions.  
Yet the four variables identified in our research are the only variables with potential to impact all  
932 million acres of farm land.  In addition, it is unlikely that historical values for farm specific 
variables for the period of study are available. Page | 2 
 
 
The objective of this study is to test the dynamic relationships among farm real estate 
values, farm returns, farm program payments, and real interest rates in the income capitalization 
model using U.S. aggregate data.  The analysis covers the period from the introduction of the 
first farm bill in 1933 through 2006.  In this paper, we address the second caveat present in 
previous studies by assuming endogeneity of the farm real estate values, farm program 
payments, and farm receipts variables in a dynamic modeling framework. 
 
In the next section, we review the literature addressing farm program payment impacts on 
farm real estate values.  In the third section, we present the income capitalization model and its 
corresponding econometric vector autoregressive specification.  U.S. data and pretesting of data 
and model are presented in the fourth section.  Next, we present and discuss the empirical results.  
Finally, the conclusions and policy implications of the results are presented. 
 
2. Earlier Literature on Farm Real Estate Values 
 
Farm real estate is a measure of the value of all land and buildings on farms.  Farm real 
estate is an important indicator of the financial condition of the farm sector and comprises 
approximately 85% of the asset portfolio of farm households (USDA, 2007b).  In addition to 
being the largest single investment item in a typical farmer’s portfolio, farm real estate is the 
principal source of collateral for farm loans, enabling farm operators to finance the purchase of 
additional farmland and equipment or to finance current operating expenses.  Wide swings in 
farm real estate values alter the equity positions, creditworthiness, and borrowing capacity of 
those farm operators and landowners who hold large percentages of assets in the form of 
farmland. 
 
Research on farm real assets, especially land values, was mainly geared towards 
examining the factors affecting land values in the 1980s and 1990s.  These empirical analyses 
were based on income capitalization models and emphasized the capitalization of expected long 
run changes in farm returns into agricultural land values.  The impacts of inflation, debt 
financing, and financial speculation received considerable attention as farm land values increased 
rapidly during the late 1970s followed by a significant decline in values after 1981.  Models 
developed to explain changes in the farm land values include income capitalization models (e.g., 
Alston, 1986; Burt, 1986), hedonic models (Palmquist and Danielson, 1989; Shonkwiler and 
Reynolds, 1986; and Xu, Mittelhammer, and Barkley, 1993), urban-rural expansion using non-
farm factors (e.g., Shi et al., 1997; Plantinga and Miller, 2001), and urban and environmental 
influences on land values (Freeman, 1974; Gardner and Barrows, 1985; and Miranowski and 
Hammes, 1984).  Featherstone and Baker (1987) examined the simultaneous impact of farm real 
estate values, real interest rates, and farm returns using U.S data from 1910 to 1985 in a vector 
autoregressive regression framework.  Falk (1991), using value of land and difference between 
value of land and rents as endogenous variables, indicates farmland price and rent movements 
are highly correlated and the price movements are not consistent with the income capitalization 
model.  He also argues the failure of farmland values to cointegrate with agricultural returns may 
be attributed to changes in the farm discount rate over time. 
 
Previous studies rely on the income capitalization model in which farm factors affecting 
net returns are used in conjunction with other exogenous variables including real interest rates, Page | 3 
 
 
inflation, and rents (Just and Miranowski, 1993).  More recent literature on farm land values 
focused on the effect of government payments on farm land values.  In the last two decades 
studies of government payment impacts have also included those of specific crops and specific 
programs (Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992; and Vantreese et al., 1989).  Payments linked to 
program bases and the resulting impact on agricultural land values was examined by Duffy et al. 
(1994).  The elimination of government payments and the resulting impact on agricultural land 
values was analyzed by Barnard et al. (2001). They used a cross-sectional examination by county 
of government payment effects on land values using the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s 2000 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.  Based on their analysis for eight 
U.S. agriculture production regions, eliminating government programs would reduce agricultural 
land values 12 to 69 percent.  The overall positive impact of government payments in increasing 
agricultural land values was concluded by Weersink et al.(1999) and Gardner (1987) using 
county data.  Goodwin et al. (2003) and Lence and Mishra (2003) also concluded the positive 
effect of government payments on cash rents. 
 
Shaik, Helmers, and Atwood (2005) cited problems with earlier studies due to the 
identification issue introduced by the counter-cyclical nature of farm program payments and 
farm returns.  The issue of identification is due to the use of farm program payments as an 
exogenous variable in the land value equation and also as an endogenous variable.  To overcome 
the identification issue Shaik, Helmers, and Atwood (2005) analyzed the contribution of farm 
program payments and crop returns to agricultural land values with an empirical application to 
48 U.S. states from 1940 to 2002 using a recursive-simultaneous equation model.  Their 
conclusion indicates the contribution of farm program payments and crop receipts to agricultural 
land values were 30 and 70 percent, respectively.  Furthermore, they found the contribution of 
farm program payments to land values has actually declined from a high of 30 to 40 percent 
during the 1938 to 1980 period to about 15 to 20 percent during subsequent farm bill periods.  
The results provide implications only at the aggregate U.S. level.  Using data from 1938-2005, 
the positive contribution of farm program payments to farm real estate values was suggested by 
Shaik, Helmers, and Atwood (2006) and Shaik (2007) using regional data and employing four 
alternative panel estimators respectively.  
 
To summarize, previous research examined the importance and effect of farm program 
payments in a static framework.  To address the short-run and long-run dynamics of farm 
program payments and other variables of income capitalization model on farm real estate values 
we propose the use of vector autoregressive models. 
 
3. Specification of Income Capitalization and Vector Autoregressive Model 
 
A normative approach to examine the returns to an asset is to use an infinite life 
capitalization equation 
 
(1)  VA r =  
 
where V is the present value of an asset, or in this case farm real estate value,  A is the annual 
return, and r  is the discount rate
3 or in this case real interest rate.  For the returns to an asset,  A
can be decomposed into the farm returns, x from the asset, and farm program payments z .  Page | 4 
 
 
Extending the capitalization model to explicitly incorporate the individual components of annual 
returns - expected farm returns to assets and farm programs can be represented as 
 
(2)  (,) Vx z r =  
 
This model could be implemented in a static framework and thus, increases in  A  
resulting from changes in farm returns and farm program payments, could be analyzed.  This 
model assumes the exogeneity of farm return, farm program payments, and real interest rates, 
and examines their effects on farm real estate values.  While land capitalization models typically 
ignore farm program payment endogeneity, microeconomic literature on policy evaluation or 
economic growth have long considered the biases introduced by policy endogeneity (e.g., 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986; Rodrik, 2005).  Standard solutions to the endogeneity problem 
are instrumental variable estimations or randomized trials.  However, neither of these strategies 
is promising when we are concerned with the country-level impact of program payments due to 
economic policies (Rodrik, 2005).  Farm program payments endogeneity requires an alternative 
modeling approach to interpret results of the income capitalization model defined in equation (2).  
For example, a significant increase in farm real estate values may change the amount and the 
direction of farm program payments to farmers.  The dynamics of change in farm payments on 
the variables of the income capitalization model, as well as the impact of changing farm real 
estate values and farm receipts on farm program payments, cannot be captured in a static 
capitalization model. 
 
Alternatively, we can examine the importance of farm returns, farm program payments, 
and real interest rates to farm real estate values in a vector autoregressive (VAR) process 
framework.  VAR modeling has become popular due to its flexibility and it is a natural extension 
of the univariate autoregressive model to multivariate time series.  The use of VAR in financial 
time series and forecasting, for example, is due to its ability to describe conditional and 
unconditional dynamic behavior.  The VAR model can also be used for inference of farm 
program payment analysis based on the structural model, as in this case.  In the structural 
analysis, unlike the VAR modeling, the causal impacts of expected or unexpected innovations or 
shift of variables cannot be examined.  The vector autoregressive approach sidesteps the need for 
structural modeling by treating every endogenous variable in the system as a function of the 
lagged values of all of the endogenous variables in the system. Since income capitalization 
model theory employed offers an idea about variables that may be correlated, but tells us little 
about the appropriate lag structure and the direction of causality among variables, the use of the 
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The mathematical representation of a vector autoregressive model for equation (2) is: 
 
(3) 
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where t is years; i=1,….,n  is the number of lags; β , γ , δ  and λ are estimated parameters 
associated with farm real estate values, real interest rates, farm returns, and farm program 
payments respectively; and  1 ε ,  2 ε ,  3 ε and  4 ε are errors for each of the equations and innovation 
that may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and 
uncorrelated with all the right-hand side variables.  Since only lagged values of endogenous 
variables appear on the right-hand side of the equations, simultaneity is not an issue and ordinary 
least square yields consistent estimates.  Moreover, even though the innovations may be 
contemporaneously correlated, ordinary least square is efficient and equivalent to generalized 
least squares since all equations have identical regressors (Enders, 1995; Hamilton, 1994). 
 
The vector autoregressive approach is appropriate if the time series under consideration 
are stationary.  However, the analysis in levels is inappropriate with nonstationary series that are 
known to be cointegrated.  The vector error correction (VEC) model is appropriate in this case 
because it has cointegration relations built into the specification so it restricts the long-run 
behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating relationships while 
allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics.  The cointegration term is called the error correction 
term since the deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected gradually through a series of 
partial short-run adjustments.  The VEC model in our case consists of a four variable system (V, 
x, z, and r) with one cointegrating equation (based on results of cointegration tests reported in the 
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Again,  1,t ε , 2,t ε , ε3,t , and ε4,t and all terms involving  ti V − Δ ,  ti x − Δ ,  ti z − Δ , and Δ ti r − Δ are stationary.  
Thus, the linear combination of four variables ( ) 111 1 ttt t Vxzr δλγ −−− − −−−must also be stationary.  
In this simple model the only right-hand side variable is the error correction term, and in long-
run equilibrium this term is zero.  However, if V, x, z, and r deviate from the long-run 
equilibrium, the error correction term will be nonzero and each variable adjusts to partially 
restore the equilibrium relation.  Finally, the coefficient  i α  measures the speed of adjustment of 
the i-th endogenous variable towards the equilibrium. 
 
4. U.S. Data and Tests of Unit Roots and Cointegration 
 
To be consistent with farm real estate values per acre, farm returns and farm program 
payments are standardized to a per acre basis using land in farms and converted into real 2000 
dollars using the implicit gross domestic product price deflator.  Land in farms is all land 
operated by farms and ranches during the year and includes crop and livestock acreage, 
wasteland, woodland, pasture, land in summer fallow, idle cropland, and land enrolled in the 
conservation reserve program, wetland reserve program, and other set aside or commodity 
acreage programs.  Farm real estate is the value of all land and buildings on farms.  Farm returns 
are the value of crop and livestock produced during the calendar year, not including any kind of 
farm program payments.  Farm program payments include all program payments except disaster 
payments and crop insurance indemnities.  Even though the crop insurance program was initiated 
in 1938, the importance in terms of payments can be observed with the major revisions 
introduction in 1980.  Hence it was not included as part of farm program payments. We use the 
conventional real interest rate definition where the rate of inflation (consumer price index) is 
subtracted from the observed Federal land bank nominal interest rate.  Data on farm receipts, 
farm program payments, farm real estate values, and interest rates are available from U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.  Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables.  The 
average value of farm real estate for the period 1933 to 2006 is $743 per acre with a standard 
deviation of $342.  The average real interest rate for the same period is 3.6 percent.  On average Page | 7 
 
 
U.S. agricultural producers produced $173 per acre of gross farm receipts for the period, 1933 to 
2006.  The average farm program payment received by agriculture producers for the same period 
is $8.30 with a standard deviation of $6.20 per acre. 
 









1 Farm program 
payments
1 
        
        
 Mean  742.7  3.6  172.9  8.3 
 Maximum  1,630.0  12.1  254.8  24.6 
 Minimum  301.5  -3.7  61.8  1.0 
 Std. Dev.  342.1  3.0  48.6  6.2 
        
1Data is available from http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/farmincome/finfidmu.htm 
 
 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) is used to test for the 
stationarity of farm real estate values, real interest rates, farm receipts, and farm program 
payments.  We were unable to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for farm receipts, 
farm real estate values, and real interest rates at either the 1% or 5% significance levels.  
However, the first differences of these variables are stationary, i.e., the variables are I (1).  
Finally, the lag length for each of the time series was determined based on the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC), and the optimal lag length is one for real interest rate and farm 
returns, and zero for farm program payments and farm real estate values for stationarity tests. 
 
We next test for cointegration of all four variables.  The Granger representation theorem 
(Enders, 1995) asserts that for any set of I (1) variables, error correction and cointegration are 
equivalent representations. After establishing that all four time series under consideration are 
I(1), we could pursue the cointegration analysis.  The multivariate cointegration test (Johansen, 
1991, 1995) was carried out with one lag in differences.  Based on the results of both trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics, we can conclude that the four variables are 
cointegrated with p-values being below 0.01 considering one cointegrating vector. 
 
Given the presence of unit roots and variables being cointegrated, we proceed with the 
vector error correction estimation. According to Hall (1994), using only the model selection 
criteria to choose the optimal lag structure may not be the most appropriate way to proceed in 
vector error correction analysis due to the presence of the long-run adjustment parameters from 
the cointegration analysis.  Hall suggested that a reasonable starting point be the maximum 
number of lags based on economic theory, prior expectations, or common sense.  One may then 
decrease the number of lags by simultaneously considering the model selection criteria and 
maintaining the original rationale (i.e., economic theory, prior expectations, or common sense) 
until the most satisfactory model is selected.  Following this procedure, we started out with a lag Page | 8 
 
 
length of 5 in all equations to account for the typical duration of the farm bill.  However, lags 3 
through 5 were insignificant both separately and jointly and were therefore deleted, and the 
model with 2 lags was selected.  The two lag model was also consistent with the lowest values of 
both SIC and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
Table 2.  Unit Root and Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Tests 
Based on First Differences, 1933-2006









Farm real estate values I(1)  0 None -2.559   0.011
Real interest rates I(1)  1 Constant -6.237   0.000
Farm returns I(1)  1
Constant and 
trend
-6.761   0.000
Farm Program payment 
I(0)
0 Constant and 
trend
-3.525     0.044
  











   
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
 5  
None
3   0.4428  76.1201  63.8761   0.0033
At most 1   0.2274  34.0030  42.9153   0.2883
At most 2   0.1055  15.4250  25.8721   0.5394
At most 3   0.0977  7.40108  12.5180   0.3045
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
6 
None
3   0.4429  42.1170  32.1183   0.0022
At most 1   0.2274  18.5781  25.8232   0.3345
At most 2   0.1055  8.02392  19.3870   0.8194
At most 3   0.0977  7.40109  12.5180   0.3045
  
1 Lag length was automatically selected based on SIC 
2 MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values 
3 denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
4 MacKinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999) p-values 
5 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level 
6 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.05 level 
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5. Results of Vector Autoregressive Income Capitalization Model 
 
Before analyzing the short-run parameters from the vector error correction model, we test 
for long run relationships among the variables.  Specifically, the variables are tested for weak 
exogeneity and speed of adjustment coefficients (Johansen and Juselius, 1994).  With one 
cointegrating vector, the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity is H0: αi1 = 0, for all i, where i is, 
respectively, farm real estate values, farm returns, real interest rates, and farm program 
payments.  The tests are distributed as chi-squared with 1 degree of freedom and are reported in 
Table 3.  The null hypotheses of weak exogeneity are clearly rejected for farm real estate values, 
real interest rates, and farm program payments, while we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
farm returns are weakly exogenous.  Hence in the long run, farm returns determine farm real 
estate values and farm program payments. 
 















 A (1,1) = 0  A (2,1) = 0  A (3,1) = 0  A (4,1) = 0
Number of iteration 
required to converge 
10 9 22 12
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1) 
Chi-square(1) 5.15688 1.5837 17.19909    9.782888
Probability  0.023154 0.2082  0.000034   0.001761
 
 
  Next, an application of the vector error correction model to examine the dynamics of 
farm real estate values is modeled for the period 1933 to 2006.  Estimated coefficients from the 
vector error correction model are presented in Table 4. 
    
Results from the farm real estate values equation indicate the one time lagged farm real 
estate value is positively affecting farm real estate values.  In other words, an increase in the 
previous period’s farm real estate values carries over to the current period. This outcome is 
consistent with earlier research (e.g., Featherstone and Baker, 1987; Burt, 1986).  Changes in the 
real interest rate do not impact, in statistical terms, the farm real estate values.  This might be due 
to the dominating effect of the general economy monetary and fiscal variables on the changes in 
the real interest rates (Just and Miranowski, 1993).  Parameter coefficients on farm returns and 
farm program payments indicate a positive and significant effect on farm real estate values.  The 
positive sign indicates that higher farm returns are expected to increase farm real estate values.    
 
Farm program payments had a positive influence on the value of farm real estate values, 
even though the primary intent of farm program payments was to provide stability of farm prices 
and incomes in times of adversity.  This positive influence might be of consequence to the new Page | 10 
 
 
entrants to farming, and small and socially disadvantaged farmers who are faced with higher 
farm real estate values. 
 
















CointEq1  0.000375* -0.000063 0.000016* 0.000046*
Diff (V (t-1))  0.5953* 0.0308 -0.0001  -0.0393*
Diff (V (t-2))  0.0186 -0.0250 -0.0057***  0.0124
Diff ( x (t-1))  1.5364* 0.2488*** 0.0015  -0.0583***
Diff ( x (t-2))  0.2059 -0.3774* 0.0090  0.0893**
Diff (r (t-1)) -6.3671 -1.0386 0.5231*  0.0059
Diff (r (t-2)) 0.3350 -1.3394 -0.2777*  -0.2176
Diff ( z (t-1))  3.9313* -0.1614 0.0947*  0.0789
Diff ( z (t-2)) 1.0713 -0.7230 0.0882** 0.2633***
Constant 2.6579 2.0699 -0.0337  0.4157
  
 R-squared  0.6109 0.2133 0.5535  0.3667
 Adj. R-squared  0.5535 0.0972 0.4876  0.2732
 Sum sq. resids  79,802 9,097 43   564
 S.E. equation  36.1694 12.2117 0.8424  3.0415
 F-statistic  10.6436 1.8378 8.4028  3.9243
 Log likelihood  -350.1 -273.0 -83.2  -174.3
 Akaike AIC  10.1442 7.9725 2.6248  5.1925
 Schwarz SC  10.4629 8.2912 2.9435  5.5111
 Mean dependent  18.2417 2.0445 -0.0757  0.1196
 S.D. dependent  54.1320 12.8525 1.1769  3.5677
  
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
Results from the farm returns equation indicate that past farm returns with positive 
parameter coefficients would lead to higher current farm returns from farming operations.  
Indeed, these are the only significant coefficients in the farm returns equation.  Low explanatory 
value and only two significant coefficients in this equation come as no surprise since farm 
production decisions are excluded from this agricultural policy-political economy specification 
of the farm returns. 
 
The farm program payment equation indicates the previous years’ farm program 
payments are positively affecting current payments.  First lagged values of farm real estate 
values and farm returns with negative parameter coefficients suggest that the declining value of Page | 11 
 
 
farm real estate values and lower returns from farming would lead to higher current farm 
program payments.  The counter-cyclical nature of farm program payments and farm returns has 
been indicated by Shaik et al, 2005, in the static framework.  This is consistent with intended 
agricultural policies used to stabilize farm prices and income.  However, the positive parameter 
coefficient on the second lagged farm returns suggest higher farm returns would lead to higher 
current farm program payments.  This positive coefficient of farm program payments may be 
self-perpetuating since the omnibus legislation covers multiple years.  
 
Next, we determine how a shock to the i
th variable affects all the endogenous variables 
through the lag structure of the vector error correction model.  As in traditional vector 
autoregressive analysis, Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) showed that innovation accounting (i.e., 
impulse responses) in vector error correction can be used to obtain information concerning the 
interactions among the variables.  As a practical matter, the two innovations εyt and εzt may be 
contemporaneously correlated if yt has a contemporaneous effect on zt and/or zt has a 
contemporaneous effect on yt.  In obtaining impulse response functions, Choleski decomposition 
is used to orthogonalize the innovations.  The impulse responses are sensitive to the ordering of 
variables.  Economic theory sometimes provides the rationale for the ordering. Usually, there is 
no such a priori knowledge and only intuition with respect to the research questions being 
addressed determine the ordering of variables.
4  In this case however, the farm real estate 
capitalization model suggests the ordering of the variables as follows: farm real estate values, 
farm returns, farm program payments, and real interest rates.  In other words, the effects of a 
shock in farm returns and farm program payments on farm real estate values are the issues of 
primary interest.  The graphs in Figure 1 trace out the effects of one-unit shocks to all εs on the 
time paths of the farm real estate values, farm returns, farm program payments, and real interest 
rates sequences.  We are most interested in the effects of one unit-shocks in εz,t, εx,t and εr,t on 
farm real estate values as well as in the effects of one unit-shocks in  εV,t and εx,t on farm program 
payments.
5  Results from the impulse response analysis are presented in Figure 1. 
    
All impacts of the innovations are considered in a 20-year timeframe.  The most 
significant finding is that an innovation or a shock to farm program payments has little or no 
impact on farm real estate values considering its long run equilibrium path.  In other words, 
sudden changes in farm policy and farm program payments do not affect the long run 
equilibrium values of farm real estate values.  This result indicates the existence of efficient 
markets where farm program payment policy disturbances do not have a lasting impact on farm 
real estate values.  On the other hand, a shock to farm returns has a lasting, significant (in terms 
of its size), and increasing effect on farm real estate values.  For example, as returns from 
farming experience a sudden increase due to implementation of new technology (e.g., increased 
use of chemicals and capital in 1940s and 1950s, or use of genetically modified seeds in the 
1990s and 2000s), the mean long run equilibrium farm real estate values increase over time 
relative to the equilibrium path based on the no-impact scenario.  This finding is consistent with 
capitalization model assumptions of returns from farming activities impacting capitalized farm 
real estate values.  Finally, a shock in real interest rates due to sudden changes in macroeconomic 
or monetary policy would lead to permanent changes in long run equilibrium of farm real estate 
values.  Again, after an adjustment period farm real estate values would stabilize at the levels 
significantly above the original equilibrium path.  Here we see more potent impacts of the farm 
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payments.  The farm sector inevitably reacts to (independent) macro-economic policies set forth 
by the government, while farm program payments may be considered more of the policy makers’ 
reaction to the situation and performance of the agricultural sector.  This point is validated 
further as we analyze the impact of sudden change in farm returns and farm real estate values on 
the levels of government transfers to agriculture. 
 
A sudden positive shock or change in farm returns for example, due to widespread 
application of new technology, leads to (permanently) lowered government transfers to 
agriculture after a short 1 to 2 year lag period.  On the other hand, a shock in farm real estate 
values, for instance a sudden increase, leads to an initially swift response by the government as 
evidenced by significantly decreased farm program payments.  However, government transfers 
exhibit a level of “stickiness” and increase over time, returning to the initial equilibrium path 
level.  These results may indicate two things: (1) in a productive sector like agriculture, 
government transfers are reduced since it seems that policy makers recognize the sector’s high 
level of performance; and, (2) farm real estate values may not be considered by the policy 
makers as the sector’s performance indicators but as the sector’s “health indicators,” and farm 
program payments will be adjusted to the pre-shock equilibrium levels in order to maintain the 
sector’s structure. 
 
All of our analysis is based on the assumption of the endogeneity of the variables in the 
model.  However, we also try to identify causal relationships.  Using Granger causality tests 
(Granger, 1969; Hamilton, 1994) we conclude the following - one way Granger causality exists 
between the farm real estate values and the farm program payments. In other words, farm real 
estate values Granger cause the farm program payments while the opposite is not true.  Second, 
one way Granger causality exists between the farm returns and the farm program payments. 
Again, farm returns Granger cause the farm program payments while the opposite does not hold.  
Finally, one way causality exists between the farm returns and the farm real estate values, i.e., 
the farm returns Granger cause the farm real estate values while the opposite does not hold.  We 
recognize how the explanatory power of these tests is low and conclusions based on them are 
weak.  Yet, they may serve as a starting point if one is to better understand the dynamic 
(reactive) nature and reasons for policy actions.   
    
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we investigate the role of farm program payments and farm returns in 
altering farm real estate values.  This research is unique in the sense it uses historical U.S. data 
from 1933-2006 to examine not only the overall effect but also the dynamics of farm program 
payments, farm receipts, real interest rates, and farm real estate values accounting for the 
endogeneity among the variables.  The outcome of this research has important policy 
implications. 
 
  Our results indicate how policy makers are reactive rather than pro-active in their 
decision making to make the transfer to farmers.  Granger causality tests suggest that farm 
returns and farm real estate values both Granger cause farm program payments while the 
opposite is not true.  Weak exogeneity test results point to farm returns determining the behavior 
of other variables in the model, including farm program payments, in the long run.  Our results Page | 14 
 
 
from the VEC analysis, where negative signs for both farm returns and farm real estate values in 
the farm program payments equation, suggest rational government that will lower its transfers as 
farm returns and farm real estate values increase.  Moreover, once farm program payments are 
implemented, they have a positive impact only in the short run (one year).  Based on impulse 
response function analysis, they do not have a lasting impact on farm real estate values.  This 
seems to be perfectly reasonable: government intervention through farm program payments may 
be prompted with the motive of maintaining the income and life style of people in rural America, 
but the value of farm assets, including farm real estate values, is ultimately a function of market 
success of farm operations expressed through farm returns.   
  
A significant increase in farm program payments, on the other hand, has a positive and 
lasting impact on farm returns.  This also seems reasonable since an infusion of additional 
revenue may serve not only to bridge current liquidity problems but to modernize and more 
widely disseminate new technologies into the farm sector.  This would clearly lead to the sector’s 
increased revenue in the longer run.  Considering endogeneity of the variables in the model 
suggests it is possible that farm program payments have a positive indirect impact (via farm 
returns) on farm real estate values. 
  
The results point to the relatively positive impact government transfers have had on farm 
real estate values.  However, the true beneficiaries of these policies may not have always been 
the intended recipients since millions of family farmers vanished from the scene in the seventy 
plus years since the inception of the first farm bill, as previously pointed out (USDA ERS, 
2007a). 
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1 Miljkovic, Jin, and Paul (2008) indicate how direct government payments to farmers peaked in 2000 at 
approximately US$ 23 billion.  This number does not include any price support payments or export enhancement 
program payments.  They suggest how successful agricultural lobbying is due to: (1) rent dissipation, as defined in 
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002), and (2) the inability for free riding in agriculture due to limited or no entry into 
the industry caused by asset (land) fixity (following the argument by Grossman and Helpman, 1994; 1996). 
 
2 Crop insurance program started in 1938 but did not catch up till 1980s and later in 1996 with increased subsidies.  
Unlike farm programs, farmers do incur a cost (of paying premium) to purchase crop insurance and receive 
indemnity if there is shortfall in production 
 
3 Discount factor contains real interest rates and risk premia.  However for this study we use only real interest rates 
due to the easy availability of the data for the historical period. 
  
4  The very idea of imposing a structure on a vector autoregressive system seems contrary to the spirit of Sims’ 
(1980, 1988) argument against “incredible identifying restriction.”  Unfortunately, there is no simple way to 
circumvent the problem; identification necessitates imposing some structure on the system.  The Cholesky 
decomposition provides a minimal set of assumptions that can be used to identify the primitive model. 
 
5  The impact of shocks in model variables on farm returns is interesting but it may not be very informative 
considering that farm returns are very dependent on productivity which is in turn influenced by changes in 
technology in the long run and farmers’ production decisions in the short run (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Stiroh, 
2002; Miljkovic, Jin, and Paul, 2008).  Again, these variables are not of interest in our policy/political economy 
framework and as such are not included in it. However, the impulse response graphs for both farm returns and real 
interest rates are available from the authors per request. 